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Abstract 
Economists and market participants have long been concerned that declining participation 
in negotiated cash sales of live cattle could have adverse impacts on the cash market and beyond. 
Economic incentives have led to a shift toward formula trading and this shift has left a relatively 
small group to carry the load of total cash negotiations. It is presumed that negotiated cash prices 
are used as base prices in formula sales meaning that the 65% of cattle sold via formula are 
priced based on 21% of live cattle sold as negotiated transactions (USDA Livestock, Poultry, & 
Grain Market News, 2019). The goal of this paper is to determine how thin the negotiated cash 
market for live and dressed cattle, as well as the beef cutout, can become and still represent an 
accurate market price. Following previous work in market hogs and live cattle markets, I applied 
Chebyshev’s inequality to weekly negotiated live and dressed cattle sales in the five major price-
reporting regions and the beef cutout to determine the number of transactions needed to arrive at 
a price that meets an acceptable accuracy criterion. I extended the method to consider average 
annual transaction levels, as others have done, but also weekly levels. In both cases, I show at 
what points in time regions have or have not had sufficient negotiated trade to maintain pricing 
accuracy. Results show that outside of certain market shocks in 2003 and between 2014 and 
2017 there continues to be sufficient trade in the negotiated cash market.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction  
 1.1 Background 
As the cattle industry has evolved and grown so have the methods by which cattle are 
traded. Over the past 30 years, there has been a significant shift in how the industry buys and 
sells  cattle. At the most basic level, price discovery occurs when a potential seller and a 
potential buyer negotiate to determine a price. This type of transaction requires some search cost, 
transportation cost, and creates an opportunity for one party to have more bargaining power 
depending on their size. Formula trades on the other hand do not require as much work. Formula 
trades require some kind of base price that has already been discovered, and different premiums 
or discounts can be built in, to account for volume and quality grades. This form of trading is 
much more efficient for both the packers and feeders because it eliminates the need for weekly 
price discovery or showlists. What is causing a sense of unease in the industry is the extreme 
transition from cash negotiations to formula trading. If the cash market is being used as the base 
price for formula trading and fewer and fewer cattle are being trading in the cash market, the 
validity of the base price comes into question. The other types of marketing strategies are 
forward contracts and grid negotiations.  
Several researchers have attempted to determine the implications of a thinning market 
and this paper hopes to build on the research that has already been done in hogs (Franken & 
Parcell, 2012) and cattle (Tomek, 1980, Ward & Choi, 1998, and Koontz, 2015) . In 2001, the 
Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting Act (LMR) was passed and created more market 
information for both feeders and packers. However, since the LMR was put in effect, cash 
negotiations have continued to decline and nothing else has seemed to change. In 1980, William 
Tomek explored the use of Chebyshev’s Inequality to measure market thinness.  Following the 
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previous use of this inequality, this study will attempt to measure market thinness and determine 
how thin markets can become while still representing market conditions. This study will evaluate 
the live and dressed 5-Area market and regional markets as well as the beef cutout to show along 
the value chain how many transactions are required for a representative market. 
Figure 11 
 
Figure 1 shows the increase of dressed cattle sold in comparison to live cattle; this is important 
when measuring market thinness in each market. The live and dressed markets are evaluated 
separately and then combined to show total negotiated cash transactions. Each regional market is 
also examined at on an individual basis and on a paired basis in order to compare the accuracy of  
regional markets’ prices. Figure 2 shows head of cattle on a yearly basis that are traded in each 
region between 2002 and 2019. As the graph shows, the Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico market 
has decreased substantially over the past 18 years. This is concerning in that Texas has the most 
cattle in the market, but they are not contributing to price discovery. The Nebraska market has 
been used in several studies as the base market for price discovery and this study will continue 
 
1 This figure shows total trade not just cash negotiated trade. 
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that due to the consistency of price discovery occurring in that market as compared to the other 
regions. 
Figure 2 
 
Figure 3 shows how each region has changed in terms of % share of total cash 
negotiations from 2002 to 2019. Looking at these two points in time, since 2002, Nebraska and 
Iowa-Minnesota have increased, Texas etc. and Colorado have decreased, and Kansas has stayed 
about the same.  
Figure 3 
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 1.2 Problem Statement 
For years the question that has been surrounding this topic is how thin is too thin? There 
have been many discussions on how thin a market can become before it no longer is 
representative of the true market conditions. Though other studies have used more sophisticated 
models to consider specific aspects of this question, Chebyshev’s inequality offers a specific 
definition of a thin market and allows for different levels of probability and accuracy that the 
price will be close to the unknown equilibrium price. The goal of this study is to evaluate each of 
the regional cattle markets as well as the overall market to determine, using Chebyshev’s 
inequality, how thin each market can become before prices are no longer representative of 
market conditions.  
 1.3 Justification of the Study 
This study adds to the previous work on this topic by offering and alternative way that the 
variance in Chebyshev’s inequality can be defined while comparing it to the definitions already 
explored in past studies. Additionally, the second manipulation of the inequality allows for more 
discussion on the pricing accuracy within this thinning cattle market. All live and dressed cattle 
markets with the beef cutout are used to show how each market, that can be used as a base price 
for formula trading, reacts to the declining cash transactions. The thesis will be split up into 5 
chapters. The first chapter has defined the basic background and motivation for this study. The 
second chapter will cover literature on alternative marketing arrangements, the mandatory price 
reporting act, price discovery, market shocks, and Chebyshev’s inequality. The third chapter will 
cover the methods and data used and the fourth chapter will cover the results and analysis. 
Finally, the fifth chapter will be conclusions and discussion of limitations and suggestions for 
continued work on this topic.  
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 2.1 Alternative Marketing Arrangements 
According to Ward et al., 1999, formula and grid trading gained interest from large feeders and 
packers in the late 1980’s. Formula in simplest terms means that the final price is established 
using a formula that add premiums and subtracts discounts from a base price . What is most 
important when understanding formula trading for this discussion, is that formula pricing is 
based on existing market information and does not contribute to new price discovery. Grid 
pricing can use a formula price as its base price and then have premiums and discounts for cattle 
who are above or below the standard. Though grid and formula prices often go together, grid 
prices are not always based off a formula price and formula prices do not always use a grid. 
Ward et al., 1999, lists several sources that the base price can be found; average price for the 
cattle scheduled to be slaughtered that week or week prior, market reports from the week prior, 
boxed beef cutout, nearby futures price, and negotiated cash price. The negotiated cash price 
however, is related to all of these other methods so in reality the negotiated is relevant for the 
base price in any formula trade. This is why having accurate price discovery is so important.  
The base price issue also reflects the quality of cattle from which it was derived. Since 
grid pricing can offer certain premiums for higher quality cattle, many of the higher quality cattle 
have been marketed this way and have been diverted from the negotiated market. The issue 
comes in when the base price being used includes lower quality cattle to market higher quality 
cattle. This is not the case for all cattle, but it occurs often enough that it has become a topic of 
research and discussion. Not all grid prices rely on a private formula price and can be discovered. 
However, like cash negotiations, negotiated grid is more expensive to discover and as seen in 
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Figure 4, there are very few negotiated grid transactions as compared to the other forms of 
marketing arrangements.  
Figure 4 
 
 2.2 Mandatory Price Reporting Act 
LMR went into effect in April 2001 and required plants that slaughter 125,000 head of 
cattle or more to report information concerning pricing, contracting for purchase, formula sales, 
and supply and demand conditions twice a day to the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) 
(Pendell & Schroeder, 2006). This report has helped provide more market information for all 
market participants. Pendell and Schroeder used Engle-Granger bivariate and Johansen’s 
multivariate cointegration2 tests to determine if the prices in the five major reporting regions 
 
2 Cointegration is a statistical property that analyzes whether a collection of non-stationary series, in this case price 
series, are related in the long run. This is important when preforming price analysis so that we can understand how 
prices in different regions are different from each other over time. 
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were cointegrated in the long run. The study determined that these markets are highly 
cointegrated in the long run both before and after the implementation of LMR.  
Bashir et al. evaluated the relationship between the implementation of LMR and price 
dispersion which they define “as the intra-week price spread for a specific grid premium or 
discount between packing firms that are reporting their grid price schedules to the AMS”. Fausti 
et al., 2010 comes to the conclusion that LMR, though it did cause some volatility in the 
premiums and discounts in grid pricing after implementation, was overall important for 
transparency within the market. Chung et al., 2018 show the farm, wholesale, and retail beef 
prices before and after the implementation of LMR and there is clearly more variability in prices 
post-LMR. However, this may not be a direct result of the report, rather repercussions of the 
global food crises in 2007 and 2008 as well as other market shocks that occurred between the 
report’s implementation and 2015. Chung et al. through several bivariate and multivariate tests, 
demonstrate how the beef supply chain has experienced faster speed of price transmission post-
LMR. Higher speeds of price transmission are important for market participants and policy 
makers to help improve market competition and price discovery.  
 
 2.3 Price Discovery  
Over the years there have been studies on the importance of price discovery and how 
changes in one market can affect another related market. Coffey et al., 2018, evaluated the 
relationship between the live cattle cash prices and the related futures market by measuring 
changes in basis prediction error (BPE). BPE is “the difference between actual and expected 
basis”.  In their results it was reported that the change in negotiated shares is positively related to 
BPE and they move together. The thinning cash market can create discrepancies between the 
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expected price that producers receive and the actual price making hedging a less effective risk 
management tool however, they found that it was not the most significant factor and that there 
are regional factors such as average weight or delivery cost that can have a larger impact on 
BPE. These regional differences make it paramount for producers to be aware of their specific 
market when using risk management tools like a futures contract. By evaluating each regional 
market’s level of thinness this study will continue the emphasis on regional information as well 
as the market as a whole. Schroeder et al., 2019, continues the conversation on basis risk. They 
define basis risk generally as “ the amount of unexpected variability in local market basis 
realized at the time a hedge is liquidated.” The absolute basis errors are reported that compare 
the negotiated cash sales to grid sales that included higher Choice cattle. Overall, they see a 
higher basis risk in cattle sold on the grid over the 10-year period between 2008 and 2017. As the 
quality diverges between the cash market and the grid, basis risk can increase, and hedging 
becomes a less effective risk management tool. A solution proposed in the study is “a composite 
fed cattle value index,” which includes negotiated cash, formula, and negotiated grid. The other 
option mentioned that may hold value in the future is Blockchain technology, especially when 
considering the desire for privacy.  
 In the USDA Daily Boxed Beef Report, authors of this report aim to help market 
participants better understand what the cutout is and how the cutout is calculated. In the boxed 
beef report, it is claimed that the beef cutout may be a source of future basis for price discovery. 
It is important to note, that this report like the live and dressed cattle do not report which loads 
were sold at which price. Joseph et al., 2013, look at price discovery and how the futures, fed 
cash, and the boxed beef prices interact with each other within the overall U.S. cattle market. 
According to the directed acyclic graphs contemporaneous causality, there is an order for which 
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market is most influential futures then fed cattle then boxed beef. They find that although the 
boxed beef price has influence in the long-run it is not important in the short-run for price 
discovery and may not be a good alternative for price discovery as originally thought. A work 
that goes farther into the use of the boxed beef report, and its relationship to the futures market, 
was done by Joseph et al., 2016. For this study they combine the Choice and Select values and 
weight them based on quality, 55% for Choice and 45% for Select. They also put the cutout 
value in terms of live animals due to the futures contract is for live cattle. The results of their 
study show that the futures market responds faster to new information than the cutout. One of the 
issues with the boxed beef report is how few transactions are included. As Joseph et al., 2016 
point out exported beef and branded products such as Certified Angus Beef are not included in 
the cutout value or load volume which means a large portion of transactions are not accounted 
for within the report. This may lead to an inaccurate value of the wholesale meat market 
regardless of how thinly traded it has become.  
 2.4 Market Shocks 
Over time the beef industry has experienced different market shocks, these shocks can 
influence price behavior. This section provides contexts for the extreme changes in the market. 
The BSE outbreaks in the U.S., especially in 2003, was one of the most notable market shocks in 
the beef industry. In Tejeda et al., 2018, short run shock effects are evaluated using a rolling 
Error Correction Model (ECM) focusing specifically on the BSE outbreaks. They discuss how 
the first BSE outbreak caused a change in the reference price in the market from futures to cash 
however, the reference price reverted back to the futures price about a month before bans on 
trade were partially lifted. The trade bans by Japan and South Korea were an unexpected shock 
that occurred after the first outbreak. The second and third outbreak did not experience a change 
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in the reference price nor were there any trade bans inflicted after the outbreaks. Results show 
that the 2003 outbreak was by far the largest shock to the market of all the outbreaks. One of the 
largest concerns of the BSE outbreak were safety shocks and Sayed Saghaian discusses the 
dynamics of vertical price adjustment within the beef sector (Saghaian, 2007). He determines 
that the wholesale market was faster to adjust than the retail market after the beef safety shock. 
The feedlot and wholesale levels took the brunt of the shock compared to the retail level and this 
may be due in part to an imbalance of power between retailers and wholesalers.  
 
 2.5 Chebyshev’s Inequality 
Chebyshev’s Inequality has been used several times to determine market thinness. The 
inequality consists of the probability that the deviation of the mean prices (intraday, daily, or 
weekly) from the true or equilibrium price falls within a particular pricing accuracy. The number 
of transactions, n, is what is of interest to insure that at a high probability, prices do not fall 
outside of the accuracy range. By comparing the number of actual transactions occurring in the 
market and the number of transactions needed, we can determine if there are sufficient 
transactions to represent the market. It was first used my Tomek in 1980 to compare the terminal 
Denver market to the market in Omaha for live cattle. Tomek goes in depth into the use of the 1st 
differences estimation of the variance which helps to show the deterioration of the Denver 
market as opposed to the Omaha market which serves as the proxy for the national market. 
Tomek concludes that thirty to thirty-five transactions were required per week were sufficient 
under the 1960’s market conditions for accurate price discovery in Denver. However, he cautions 
the reader to take this number with a grain of salt for a couple reasons. First this number depends 
on the 1960’s market conditions and does not serve as a standard across time. Secondly, this 
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estimate is based on the standard of precision staying within $0.10 per hundredweight which can 
easily change if there are any shocks or changes in market structure.  
In 1998, Ward and Choi used Chebyshev’s inequality with data from the Fed Cattle 
Market Simulator to explore relationships in price reporting accuracy. This study is very 
different than the others using the same equation in that the transactions are not actual 
transactions from the market but simply a representation of how the market could react to certain 
conditions at the time. They follow what Tomek did and took it further by solving not only for 
number of transactions needed at a given probability and pricing error but solved for the 
probability and pricing error themselves. The probability gives the likelihood that the price will 
fall within the pricing error range at the to show how market deterioration could occur, three 
different scenarios where tested which reduced the number of transactions in the market.  
 In 2012, Franken and Parcell revisited Chebyshev’s inequality to evaluate market 
thinness in hogs and pork. They followed Tomek’s work fairly closely however, they compare 
negotiated hogs to the national carcass cutout. One of the key points that Franken and Parcell 
address is the quality concerns of hogs traded in the cash market as opposed to other marketing 
arrangements. Franken and Parcell suggests that the St. Joseph market need not rely solely on 
their own volume for price discovery since the Iowa-Minnesota market has sufficient price 
discovery. However, this principle may not apply to the cattle market as easily since the market 
conditions are not as similar between the five regional beef markets as these two hog markets. 
Franken and Parcell take it one step further than Tomek in that they also evaluate the quality 
concerns of the hogs traded through cash negotiations. They determine that the declining number 
of hogs sold in the cash market maybe the reason for a decrease in quality of these hogs. Overall 
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improvements in genetics in the industry may also contribute to the decrease in lower quality 
hogs being sold in the market regardless of marketing arrangement.  
While defining thinning markets and policy implications, Koontz, 2015 uses Chebyshev’s 
inequality as an empirical way to measure market thinness in the five regional fed cattle markets, 
boxed beef, and futures market. Unlike, Tomek and those before him Koontz uses a vector error 
correction model (VECM) to show the multilateral relationship between these seven markets 
rather than the typical bilateral relationships that others have used. Using a unit root test, he 
confirms that the seven price series are nonstationary and using the Johansen test he proves that 
the prices are cointegrated. With the predictions and residuals from the VECM, Koontz 
estimates, on a monthly basis, the transactions needed for accurate price discovery. He uses the 
VECM to measure the variance instead of the 1st difference method which differs from the 
previous work with this inequality. Koontz also explores the influence that the probability has on 
transactions needed at 80% and 95%. As can be expected, with a higher probability the 
transactions needed go up and the opposite occurs when the probability is lower. This creates a 
need for market participants to decide how accurate they want the market to be. He comes to the 
conclusion that for individual, alternative methods of marketing cattle outweigh the benefits of 
having a thicker cash market. This is not necessarily the case for the market as a whole and the 
issue of market thinness continues to be an important topic of conversation for market 
participants and policy makers alike.  
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Chapter 3 - Data and Methodology  
 3.1 Methods 
As a market participant there is the hope that the market is efficient and responds 
accurately to change. When markets become thinner, confidence in reported prices and market 
activity can become low. Tomek in attempting to understand price behavior used Chebyshev’s 
inequality as a way to empirically measure market thinness. This inequality does not give a 
definitive answer to “how thin can the market get” but it does help to show the gravity of the 
market thinness issue. 
Using Chebyshev’s inequality, n is the number of transactions need at some high 
probability level P in order to assure that the daily, or in this case weekly, price Xn does not 
deviate from the equilibrium price µ within a certain level of accuracy ± c. Therefore, 
(1)      𝑃(−𝑐 ≤ 𝑋𝑛 − 𝜇 ≤ 𝑐) ≥ 1 −
𝜎2
𝑛𝑐2
 
The variance is σ2 which is the distribution of prices over time. By rearranging the equation, we 
can find n which is the number of transactions.  
(2)      𝑛 =  
𝜎2
(1 − 𝑃)𝑐2
 
 The higher the n, the more transactions needed to have a representative market. Additionally, the 
higher the desired level of accuracy, the number of transactions goes up. For the purpose of this 
paper Xn is assumed to be equal to µ since the true mean is unknown. One of the points of 
contingency in Chebyshev’s inequality is how to define σ2. In this paper there are three methods 
used to calculate the variance. First, the sample variance of the price is taken for each year. 
Secondly, following the work of both Tomek and Franken and Parcell, a first differenced 
equation is used as a pairwise measure of the variance: 
14 
(3) 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡−1 =  𝜇 +  𝛽(𝑥𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡−1) + 𝜐𝑡   
where yt and xt are the individual region prices and υt is the error term in time t. The Augmented 
Dicky-Fuller as a test for non-stationarity, the prices are non-stationary for the individual price 
series and stationary in 1st differences. The estimated variance of µ is the measure for σ2. Lastly, 
taking one variance for a year causes prices from December of that year to affect the prices from 
January. This is a problem when there is one event during year that can cause the variance to be 
unrepresentative of what is happening week to week. To account for this, a quarterly rolling 
variance is used to reflect current forces in the market. With these 3 measures of σ2, this study 
hopes to add to the previous work by comparing the different measures of the variance.  
Another manipulation of Chebyshev’s original equation allows us to calculate the level of 
accuracy c with the following equation: 
(4) 𝑐 =  ±
𝜎
√𝑛 ∗ (1 − 𝑃)
 
where n is the number of actual transactions and σ is tested with all three measures used to 
calculate the variance. The purpose of this additional manipulation is too better gauge the range 
of accuracy so that it is not arbitrary. When solving for n Chebyshev’s inequality allows us to see 
what should be occurring in the market but for c, we use what has actually occurred and how that 
changes the range of accuracy. 
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 3.2 Data   
Data was collected from Livestock Marketing Information Center (LMIC), who archives 
the reports from the USDA AMS, for weekly cash negotiations from 2002 through 2019 for the 
5-Area market and individual state markets. The beef cutout data was also collected from LMIC 
from 2004 through 2019.  All the data used was collected after the implementation of LMR, so 
there were no adjustments made to include previous years. For each market, steers and heifers 
were combined to provide a better representation of the total transactions of live and dressed 
cattle. The data is reported on a per head basis, as transaction size is not public information; 
therefore, in order to create a standard transaction size an informed average transaction size of 40 
head was used. The transaction size itself is an assumption and a transaction size of 120 was also 
used in order to compare a smaller lot of cattle with a larger one. Using one size over time is also 
an assumption that transaction size stays constant however, this is not the case. It is important to 
note that transactions should be measured and not head to best mimic actual market conditions. 
Adjustments were made to combine the dressed and live cattle prices and weights by putting the 
dressed data in live equivalent terms. These adjustments were only made when combining the 
two series otherwise, the dressed data was measured in its original form. For the beef cutout, 
prices and loads for choice and select were combined. The loads do not necessarily match up 
with the prices but for the purpose of this study it is assumed that each load is sold at the given 
price for that week. For the measurement of n, there were four different levels of c used in order 
to show how few or how many trades were needed at increasing allowances. The accuracy levels 
used were ±0.25, ±0.50, ±1.00, and ±1.503. Franken and Parcell used ±0.25, ±0.35, and ±0.45, 
 
3 In the case of the cutout, c values were increased to $0.50, $1.00, $1.50, and $2.00 due to higher mean prices and 
the measure of c. See appendix Figure 18.  
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but due to the nature of the beef cattle market, increases/decreases of 10 cents was not 
representative of the spread between prices. Table 1 and Table 2 present the summary statistics  
for live and dressed cattle as well as the boxed beef cutout. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Summary Statistics for Weekly Steers and Heifers  
Live Mean Max Min SD 
5-Area 
Head1 71,232 194,534 11,400 33,334 
Weight2  1,295 1,457 1,153 70 
Price3  106.33 171.66 61.96 24 
Nebraska 
Head 15,847 42,613 1,327 6,435 
Weight  1,342 1,508 1,178 61 
Price  106.38 172.21 61.85 25 
Kansas 
Head 22,763 84,687 330 12,130 
Weight  1,330 1,497 1,113 57 
Price  172.83 172.83 61.87 24 
Iowa-Minnesota  
Head 7,794 26,496 72 4,229 
Weight  1,357 1,519 1,197 104 
Price  105.88 170.21 61.79 24 
Texas-Oklahoma- 
New Mexico 
Head 20,775 84,155 35 17,908 
Weight  1,226 1,525 1,126 50 
Price  106.31 173.00 61.98 24 
Colorado 
Head 4,545 18,379 200 2,802 
Weight  1,305 1,527 1,159 67 
Price  106.01 173.14 61.79 25 
Dressed  Max Min Mean SD 
5-Area     
Head1 39,326 97,237 4,924 19,018 
Weight2  846 952 751 41 
Price3  168.69 270.35 97.63 39 
Nebraska     
Head 23,710 87,612 2,042 11,987 
Weight  850 957 757 41 
Price  168.79 270.65 97.27 39 
1 Weekly average head, =939 observations (2002 to 2019) 
2 Weekly average carcass weight (lbs.) 
3 Weekly average price ($/cwt) 
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The 5-Area market was also tested at three different levels of probability of 85%, 90%, 
and 95% in order to gauge how the probability influenced n, see Figure 154 in the appendix. In 
this figure, the black line is there to emphasize the difference in scale as the probability level 
goes up.   
  
 
4 All tables and graphs will be reported using a 90% probability unless otherwise stated  
Table 2 Summary Statistics for Weekly National Beef Cutout  
 Mean Max Min SD 
Loads1 816 2,024 110 363 
Price2  178.85 261.04 121.44 36 
1 Weekly average loads, n=834 observations (2004 to 2019) 
2 Weekly average price ($/cwt) 
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Chapter 4 - Results  
 4.1 Measurement of Transactions Needed 
 4.11 Calculated Variance  
As discussed before, live cattle and dressed are evaluated separately before they are 
combined to show the full market transactions at a given time. In Error! Reference source not f
ound. the 5-Area market shows mean weekly transactions (actual transactions) versus needed 
transactions at four different accuracy levels. The two different transaction sizes are also 
compared here to show how different lot sizes can affect the years of sufficient and insufficient 
transactions5. At the $0.25 and $0.50 there are insufficient transactions in 2003 and in years 
between 2014 and 2017.  
Table 3 5-Area Live Negotiated Transactions and Transactions Needed 
 Year 
Mean 
Weekly 
Head 
Mean Weekly 
Transactions 
(P=90%, c= values in $/cwt) 
Variance ±0.25 ±0.50 ±1.00 ±1.50 
40 head per 
transaction 2003 110,027 2,751 85.78 13,726 3,431 858 381 
2009 75,744 1,894 3.85 616 154 38 17 
2014 39,235 981 80.59 12,894 3,224 806 358 
2015 28,626 716 235.52 37,683 9,421 2,355 1,047 
2016 46,126 1,153 148.53 23,765 5,941 1,485 660 
         
120 head per 
transaction 
2003 110,027 917 85.78 13,726 3,431 858 381 
2009 75,744 631 3.85 616 154 38 17 
2014 39,235 327 80.59 12,894 3,224 806 358 
2015 28,626 239 235.52 37,683 9,421 2,355 1,047 
2016 46,126 384 148.53 23,765 5,941 1,485 660 
 
5 For the remainder of the results, a transaction size of 40 will be used in order to be more concise. Realistically each 
region should have its own transaction size that best fits that individual market and it should change over time.  
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These spikes in the variance are caused by shocks to the market in 2003 with the BSE 
outbreak and the market crash around 2015. This method of calculating the variance only takes 
into account one market at a time and does not take into consideration if the price series are 
related to one another or that they are non-stationary. However, it is still valuable as it shows the 
impact that market shocks can have on each individual market. Table 4 shows that the Nebraska 
live required transactions follow a similar trend to the 5-Area transactions. Nebraska is the 
market with largest share of cash negotiations out of the five regions and offers the most reliable 
pricing. Though the Texas region may have had more transactions leading up to 2011, Nebraska 
has been most consistent over time. In Figure 17 Figure 16 of the appendix, actual transactions 
are compared to transactions needed at the $1.00 and $1.50 accuracy levels with a 90% 
probability. Though the BSE outbreak may have affected prices between 2003 and 2004 causing 
the variance to increase, transactions stayed relatively consistent and at the $1.50 accuracy level 
there are just enough actual transactions. During the market crash not only was there extreme 
price volatility but the number of transactions went down making the difference between actual 
and needed transactions more pronounced. At the end of 2018 it looked as if transactions were 
going to increase into 2019 however, that does not seem to be the case here. If market 
participants are okay with the lower levels of pricing accuracy, than there are sufficient 
transactions here. 
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sufficient transactions in all but 2015 and 2016. However, lowering the standard does not make 
the issue of market thinness go away, the pricing accuracy could be ± $5.00/cwt but that would 
be completely unrealistic in terms of actual market conditions. Although Kansas has decreased 
their participation in the cash market, they still have more transactions than both Texas and 
Colorado. The variance in Kansas also seems to be slightly lower than in Nebraska for all years 
except 2019 as seen in Table 5. This may be due to the fact that several large packers are 
surrounded by large feedyards especially in Southwest Kansas. Decreased transportation costs 
create a more efficient market and makes price discovery less expensive.  
Table 4 Nebraska Live Negotiated Transactions and Transactions Needed 
Year 
Mean Weekly 
Head 
Mean Weekly 
Transactions 
                   (P=90%, c= values in $/cwt) 
Variance ±0.25 ±0.50 ±1.00 ±1.50 
2002 13,937 348 13.57 2,170 543 136 60 
2003 19,553 489 102.05 16,327 4,082 1,020 454 
2004 21,404 535 14.64 2,343 586 146 65 
2005 18,747 469 21.54 3,446 861 215 96 
2006 17,954 449 18.69 2,991 748 187 83 
2007 16,936 423 13.96 2,234 558 140 62 
2008 12,227 306 21.29 3,406 852 213 95 
2009 13,297 332 5.03 805 201 50 22 
2010 14,829 371 28.70 4,592 1,148 287 128 
2011 14,160 354 42.09 6,734 1,684 421 187 
2012 12,578 314 13.70 2,192 548 137 61 
2013 11,102 278 14.50 2,320 580 145 64 
2014 16,549 414 79.50 12,720 3,180 795 353 
2015 10,407 260 237.32 37,971 9,493 2,373 1,055 
2016 16,201 405 149.68 23,949 5,987 1,497 665 
2017 19,877 497 83.06 13,290 3,322 831 369 
2018 22,317 558 43.66 6,986 1,746 437 194 
2019 12,845 321 62.37 9,980 2,495 624 277 
  
 
21 
 
 
Table 5 Kansas Live Negotiated Transactions and Transactions Needed 
Year 
Mean Weekly 
Head 
Mean Weekly 
Transactions 
                   (P=90%, c= values in $/cwt) 
Variance ±0.25 ±0.50 ±1.00 ±1.50 
2002 29,842 746 13.17 2,107 527 132 59 
2003 38,832 971 82.83 13,253 3,313 828 368 
2004 36,608 915 14.74 2,359 590 147 66 
2005 33,697 842 18.82 3,011 753 188 84 
2006 30,715 768 21.72 3,475 869 217 97 
2007 27,998 700 10.96 1,753 438 110 49 
2008 24,469 612 20.00 3,199 800 200 89 
2009 25,458 636 3.87 619 155 39 17 
2010 30,124 753 23.98 3,837 959 240 107 
2011 26,631 666 37.33 5,972 1,493 373 166 
2012 17,972 449 14.84 2,375 594 148 66 
2013 12,699 317 16.06 2,570 643 161 71 
2014 8,526 213 92.51 14,802 3,701 925 411 
2015 6,424 161 217.36 34,778 8,695 2,174 966 
2016 16,551 414 147.20 23,552 5,888 1,472 654 
2017 16,159 404 80.93 12,949 3,237 809 360 
2018 14,452 361 42.46 6,793 1,698 425 189 
2019 12,067 302 68.76 11,001 2,750 688 306 
 
Table 6 Iowa-Minnesota Live Negotiated Transactions and Transactions Needed 
Year 
Mean Weekly 
Head 
Mean Weekly 
Transactions 
                   (P=90%, c= values in $/cwt) 
Variance ±0.50 ±1.00 ±1.50 ±2.00 
2002 4,119 103 12.98 519 130 58 32 
2003 6,380 160 105.96 4,238 1,060 471 265 
2004 7,806 195 13.27 531 133 59 33 
2005 6,517 163 21.86 874 219 97 55 
2006 6,973 174 16.22 649 162 72 41 
2007 9,136 228 14.01 560 140 62 35 
2008 6,271 157 20.05 802 200 89 50 
2009 6,715 168 5.33 213 53 24 13 
2010 8,288 207 25.57 1,023 256 114 64 
2011 9,025 226 41.02 1,641 410 182 103 
2012 8,918 223 12.96 518 130 58 32 
2013 6,601 165 11.62 465 116 52 29 
2014 9,819 245 74.28 2,971 743 330 186 
2015 8,486 212 259.70 10,388 2,597 1,154 649 
2016 5,949 149 149.16 5,966 1,492 663 373 
2017 7,736 193 81.44 3,258 814 362 204 
2018 11,505 288 48.59 1,944 486 216 121 
2019 9,973 249 61.28 2,451 613 272 153 
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The Iowa-Minnesota market is the only market that seems to be increasing cash 
negotiations rather than decreasing. In Table 6, there are clearly fewer transactions than in other 
regions, but this does not necessarily mean that price discovery is not occurring, for this market 
there are overall less cattle, unlike Texas which has more cattle than any other region. The 
pricing accuracy is widened for Iowa to account for the differences in this market. The 5-Area 
dressed market has had fewer negotiated cash transactions, but more and more cattle are being 
sold on a dressed basis as shown in Figure 1. Although the trends in live and dressed are similar, 
the variance is significantly larger from 2014 on. For the dressed market, it is unlikely that price 
discovery will increase to the level of the live market again. Most studies have looked at the live 
and dressed markets together, either by putting the dressed in terms of live or vice versa, it is 
important though to look at them separately as well in order to fully understand what is going on 
in each market and where issues of market thinness are most prevalent.  
 
Table 7 5-Area Dressed Negotiated Transactions and Transactions Needed 
Year 
Mean Weekly 
Head 
Mean Weekly 
Transactions 
                   (P=90%, c= values in $/cwt) 
Variance ±0.50 ±1.00 ±1.50 ±2.00 
2002 55,469 2,201 35.28 5,645 1,411 353 157 
2003 46,848 1,859 241.99 38,719 9,680 2,420 1,076 
2004 52,339 2,077 34.16 5,465 1,366 342 152 
2005 61,101 2,425 62.25 9,960 2,490 623 277 
2006 59,161 2,348 47.99 7,678 1,920 480 213 
2007 57,735 2,291 37.77 6,044 1,511 378 168 
2008 61,362 2,435 46.41 7,425 1,856 464 206 
2009 51,928 2,061 11.46 1,833 458 115 51 
2010 44,353 1,760 58.38 9,341 2,335 584 259 
2011 36,132 1,434 94.33 15,092 3,773 943 419 
2012 26,972 1,070 36.23 5,796 1,449 362 161 
2013 25,265 1,003 29.45 4,712 1,178 295 131 
2014 19,708 782 157.65 25,224 6,306 1,577 701 
2015 21,747 863 651.73 104,276 26,069 6,517 2,897 
2016 25,231 1,001 392.24 62,759 15,690 3,922 1,743 
2017 20,709 822 219.59 35,135 8,784 2,196 976 
2018 21,393 849 120.66 19,305 4,826 1,207 536 
2019 19,827 787 167.76 26,842 6,710 1,678 746 
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In the case of the Nebraska dressed transactions, there is more price discovery occurring 
in this market leading up to 2014. 
 
Nebraska is the only dressed market reported here because in the other regions there are too 
many weeks without any cash negotiations after 2014. These gaps are a signal, in and of 
themselves, that cattle sold on a dressed basis in the cash market have declined significantly over 
the past five  years. Table 9 shows the combined live and dressed transactions. With both live 
and dressed there are fewer years with insufficient transactions, especially at the $1.00 and $1.50 
accuracy levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 Nebraska Dressed Negotiated Transactions and Transactions Needed 
Year 
Mean Weekly 
Head 
Mean Weekly 
Transactions 
                   (P=90%, c= values in $/cwt) 
Variance ±0.50 ±1.00 ±1.50 ±2.00 
2002 33,025 669 35.73 2,858 715 318 179 
2003 30,475 601 245.09 19,607 4,902 2,179 1,225 
2004 33,445 666 35.42 2,833 708 315 177 
2005 33,525 675 65.72 5,257 1,314 584 329 
2006 34,652 711 50.07 4,006 1,001 445 250 
2007 34,292 698 40.85 3,268 817 363 204 
2008 36,437 751 47.03 3,763 941 418 235 
2009 31,731 677 12.46 996 249 111 62 
2010 28,651 603 58.07 4,645 1,161 516 290 
2011 23,595 501 94.72 7,578 1,894 842 474 
2012 17,198 376 37.08 2,966 742 330 185 
2013 15,368 332 27.37 2,190 547 243 137 
2014 11,654 258 156.64 12,531 3,133 1,392 783 
2015 12,409 280 655.65 52,452 13,113 5,828 3,278 
2016 14,932 332 387.75 31,020 7,755 3,447 1,939 
2017 12,097 267 218.71 17,496 4,374 1,944 1,094 
2018 11,851 264 117.93 9,435 2,359 1,048 590 
2019 11,107 246 169.81 13,585 3,396 1,509 849 
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Table 10 shows that leading up to 2013 and during 2018 there were sufficient 
transactions in the market. LMIC only provides data for the beef cutout from 2004 on, and 
between that time and 2019 there has been a steady decrease in cash negotiated transactions. The 
pricing accuracy has changed for this series due to the higher mean prices, in the section on 
solving for the pricing accuracy, these ranges better fit the market than the ranges used for the 
live or dressed markets. As discussed previously the beef cutout does not include any export or 
branded beef prices and volumes. By excluding these transactions and prices the cutout is 
missing out on a significant proportion of the beef being sold. Producers try to gain the 
premiums that come with prime, choice, and branding such as CAB which creates higher quality 
beef in the market overall, but there are serious draw backs when it comes to price discovery.   
 
6 Live and dressed transactions were combined by putting dressed transactions in terms of live weights and prices 
using a 63% dressing percentage. Transportation cost was accounted for by subtracting $0.50 from the dressed price. 
Table 9 5-Area Live and Dressed Negotiated Transactions and Transactions Needed6 
Year 
Mean Weekly 
Head 
Mean Weekly 
Transactions 
                   (P=90%, c= values in $/cwt) 
Variance ±0.25 ±0.50 ±1.00 ±1.50 
2002 90,249 3,345 13.07 2,091 523 131 58 
2003 110,027 3,286 85.78 13,726 3,431 858 381 
2004 115,779 3,469 14.44 2,310 577 144 64 
2005 109,978 3,346 19.24 3,079 770 192 86 
2006 101,855 3,149 19.85 3,177 794 199 88 
2007 95,117 2,956 11.38 1,821 455 114 51 
2008 79,216 2,474 19.66 3,145 786 197 87 
2009 75,744 2,410 3.85 616 154 38 17 
2010 78,386 2,472 24.85 3,976 994 248 110 
2011 70,380 2,231 38.87 6,220 1,555 389 173 
2012 51,515 1,664 14.13 2,261 565 141 63 
2013 37,715 1,168 14.75 2,360 590 148 66 
2014 39,235 1,305 81.01 12,962 3,241 810 360 
2015 28,626 977 234.82 37,571 9,393 2,348 1,044 
2016 46,126 1,575 148.27 23,723 5,931 1,483 659 
2017 54,841 1,841 80.93 12,949 3,237 809 360 
2018 56,032 1,896 43.70 6,993 1,748 437 194 
2019 39,519 988 63.45 10,152 2,538 635 282 
25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 10 Boxed Beef Cutout Negotiated Transactions and Transactions Needed 
 
Year 
Mean Weekly 
Transactions 
                   (P=90%, c= values in $/cwt) 
Variance ±0.50 ±1.00 ±1.50 ±2.00 
2004 1325 53.73 2149 537 239 134 
2005 1374 74.27 2971 743 330 186 
2006 1292 20.85 834 208 93 52 
2007 1218 53.48 2139 535 238 134 
2008 1030 67.26 2691 673 299 168 
2009 963 19.76 790 198 88 49 
2010 814 66.58 2663 666 296 166 
2011 811 39.37 1575 394 175 98 
2012 720 22.31 893 223 99 56 
2013 601 27.00 1080 270 120 68 
2014 565 184.34 7374 1843 819 461 
2015 518 393.74 15750 3937 1750 984 
2016 493 263.35 10534 2634 1170 658 
2017 467 231.50 9260 2315 1029 579 
2018 434 43.09 1724 431 192 108 
2019 433 156.84 6274 1568 697 392 
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 4.12 1st Differences 
In order to measure how the regional markets interact with each other, a first differences 
measure of the variance is used. Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, the individual 
price series was regressed for the year and then the 1st difference variables were regressed for the 
year using the following equation 
(3) 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡−1 =  𝜇 +  𝛽(𝑥𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡−1) + 𝜐𝑡.  
The estimated variance is equal to the sum of squared errors of µ. The regression was estimated 
for each year. As explained by Tomek, for each region, “the appropriate σ2 relates to the changes 
in price differences” between one region and another Franken and Parcell compare the Iowa-
Minnesota market to the St. Joseph markets and for this thesis, five markets pairs are compared 
to get the estimated variance for each region. The five pairs are shown in Table 11. 
 
Table 11 1st Difference Pairs for 
Estimated Variance 
Kansas Nebraska 
Nebraska Kansas 
Nebraska Iowa-Minnesota 
Nebraska Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico 
Nebraska Colorado 
 
In the following tables the calculated variance that was used in the previous section is 
compared with the 1st difference estimation. In Table 12, the Nebraska variance is obtained by 1st 
differencing it with the Kansas prices. The probability and accuracy level for all reported tables 
is set at 90% and $1.50/cwt. The estimated variance instead of responding to market shocks, goes 
up or down based on how different the two price series are to each other. Between 2002 and 
2014, the calculated and estimated variances follow the same trend. However, as shown in 
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Figure 5, during the market crash the Kansas and Nebraska prices converge causing the required 
transactions to go down rather than up.  By using the 1st differences estimation of  the variance 
there are only insufficient transactions, at 90% probability and $1.50/cwt accuracy level, during 
2003. 
Table 12 1st Difference Nebraska Live Negotiated Transactions and Needed 
Transactions 
Year 
Mean Weekly 
Transactions 
Calculated 
Variance 
Variance in 1st 
Differences 
(p=90%, c= ±$1.50/cwt) 
Calculated 
Needed 
1st Difference 
Needed 
2002 348 13.57 9.99 60 44 
2003 489 102.05 123.02 454 547 
2004 535 14.64 82.26 65 366 
2005 469 21.54 30.27 96 135 
2006 449 18.69 35.83 83 159 
2007 423 13.96 23.49 62 104 
2008 306 21.29 23.39 95 104 
2009 332 5.03 14.56 22 65 
2010 371 28.70 22.98 128 102 
2011 354 42.09 49.83 187 221 
2012 314 13.70 17.33 61 77 
2013 278 14.50 17.78 64 79 
2014 414 79.50 74.67 353 332 
2015 260 237.32 57.05 1,055 254 
2016 405 149.68 82.69 665 367 
2017 497 83.06 65.49 369 291 
2018 558 43.66 63.68 194 283 
2019 321 62.37 47.30 277 210 
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Figure 5 
 
 
Table 13 1st Difference Nebraska Dressed Negotiated Transactions and Needed 
Transactions 
Year 
Mean Weekly 
Transactions 
Calculated 
Variance 
Variance in 1st 
Differences 
(p=90%, c= ±$1.50/cwt) 
Calculated 
Needed 
1st Difference 
Needed 
2002 669 35.73 42.07 159 187 
2003 601 245.09 410.93 1,089 1,826 
2004 666 35.42 466.65 157 2,074 
2005 675 65.72 109.45 292 486 
2006 711 50.07 105.88 223 471 
2007 698 40.85 152.04 182 676 
2008 751 47.03 128.36 209 570 
2009 677 12.46 60.17 55 267 
2010 603 58.07 125.94 258 560 
2011 501 94.72 182.27 421 810 
2012 376 37.08 160.95 165 715 
2013 332 27.37 188.80 122 839 
2014 258 156.64 461.15 696 2,050 
2015 280 655.65 234.54 2,914 1,042 
2016 332 387.75 258.67 1,723 1,150 
2017 267 218.71 265.56 972 1,180 
2018 264 117.93 149.03 524 662 
2019 246 169.81 375.35 755 1,668 
 
Table 13 provides results that were not expected based on previous measures. As in the live 
estimation the Nebraska prices are paired with the Kansas prices, the main reason for this pairing 
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was that the Kansas market had less weeks with no transactions7. The estimated variance is much 
larger than the calculated variance and as shown in Figure 68 during the BSE outbreak. It is also 
interesting here how different the dressed market looks from the live market above, there may be 
times when these markets do not respond the same to shocks in the market.  
Figure 6 
 
For Table 14, Kansas prices were differenced against Nebraska prices in order to get the 
estimated variance. The trend in the Kansas market is similar to that in the Nebraska save the 
period between 2003 and 2004, where transactions needed stay at 500 transactions rather than 
coming back down in 2004. Figure 17 in the appendix shows all of the regions not reported in 
the main body.  
 
 
 
 
7 The few weeks that were missing were filled in by using the prices from the Kansas live prices and adjusted using 
a 63% dressing percentage.  
8 c is equal to $1.50/cwt for all figures comparing the estimated and calculated variances.  
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Table 14 1st Difference Kansas Live Negotiated Transactions and Needed Transactions 
Year 
Mean Weekly 
Transactions 
Calculated 
Variance 
Variance in 1st 
Differences 
(p=90%, c= ±$1.50/cwt) 
Calculated 
Needed 
1st Difference 
Needed 
2002 746 13.17 9.30 59 41 
2003 971 82.83 109.26 368 486 
2004 915 14.74 111.47 66 495 
2005 842 18.82 35.89 84 160 
2006 768 21.72 37.27 97 166 
2007 700 10.96 29.12 49 129 
2008 612 20.00 20.03 89 89 
2009 636 3.87 14.63 17 65 
2010 753 23.98 20.83 107 93 
2011 666 37.33 52.04 166 231 
2012 449 14.84 18.93 66 84 
2013 317 16.06 24.15 71 107 
2014 213 92.51 67.51 411 300 
2015 161 217.36 59.99 966 267 
2016 414 147.20 77.36 654 344 
2017 404 80.93 64.32 360 286 
2018 361 42.46 62.18 189 276 
2019 302 68.76 61.34 306 273 
 
The Iowa-Minnesota estimated variance is very interesting in that it does not really spike 
at any point. Since it is compared to Nebraska prices there seems to be a very close relationship 
between these two price series. This case in particular proves why the variance is so important in 
this method because depending on how it is measured, the results can be very different.  
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Table 15 1st Difference Iowa-Minnesota Live Negotiated Transactions and 
Needed Transactions 
Year 
Mean Weekly 
Transactions 
Calculated 
Variance 
Variance in 1st 
Differences 
(p=90%, c= ±1.50) 
Calculated 
Needed 
1st Difference 
Needed 
2002 103 12.98 9.04 58 40 
2003 160 105.96 31.98 471 142 
2004 195 13.27 30.13 59 134 
2005 163 21.86 22.51 97 100 
2006 174 16.22 29.30 72 130 
2007 228 14.01 30.64 62 136 
2008 157 20.05 30.49 89 136 
2009 168 5.33 25.37 24 113 
2010 207 25.57 16.15 114 72 
2011 226 41.02 38.61 182 172 
2012 223 12.96 41.32 58 184 
2013 165 11.62 40.56 52 180 
2014 245 74.28 47.45 330 211 
2015 212 259.70 39.54 1,154 176 
2016 149 149.16 69.39 663 308 
2017 193 81.44 74.14 362 330 
2018 288 48.59 68.90 216 306 
2019 249 61.28 46.99 272 209 
 
 For Texas, only data through 2018 was used due to several weeks of no transactions 
during 2019.  
Table 16 1st Difference Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico Live Negotiated 
Transactions and Needed Transactions 
Year 
Mean Weekly 
Transactions 
Calculated 
Variance 
Variance in 1st 
Differences 
(p=90%, c= ±1.50) 
Calculated 
Needed 
1st Difference 
Needed 
2002 951 12.87 10.27 57 46 
2003 1,032 78.64 48.09 350 214 
2004 1,109 14.91 42.77 66 190 
2005 1,102 18.54 43.43 82 193 
2006 953 21.52 42.73 96 190 
2007 872 10.05 32.79 45 146 
2008 782 19.83 24.43 88 109 
2009 628 3.71 13.84 16 62 
2010 508 23.81 19.94 106 89 
2011 406 36.30 55.47 161 247 
2012 217 16.04 31.42 71 140 
2013 121 16.95 30.86 75 137 
2014 49 91.90 94.11 408 418 
2015 36 217.25 97.27 966 432 
2016 104 147.77 62.27 657 277 
2017 160 82.17 53.71 365 239 
2018 117 40.84 79.46 182 353 
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Similar to Iowa, Texas prices seem to within the same range as the Nebraska market, 
though there is more of a response during the market crash around 2015. This result was 
expected since price discovery in Texas has decreased significantly since 2005 and it is 
presumed that those marketing cattle within the Texas region are marketing them based off of the 
Nebraska prices.  
 
Table 17 1st Difference Colorado Live Negotiated Transactions and Needed Transactions 
Year 
Mean Weekly 
Transactions 
Calculated 
Variance 
Variance in 1st 
Differences 
(p=90%, c= ±1.50) 
Calculated 
Needed 
1st Difference 
Needed 
2002 109 13.46 9.33 34 23 
2003 157 95.38 37.45 238 94 
2004 140 15.23 18.55 38 46 
2005 165 20.49 13.97 51 35 
2006 194 19.55 11.63 49 29 
2007 153 13.74 17.64 34 44 
2008 123 21.56 13.51 54 34 
2009 131 4.46 12.78 11 32 
2010 116 27.61 10.86 69 27 
2011 107 42.59 11.18 106 28 
2012 85 14.42 20.17 36 50 
2013 62 16.79 13.82 42 35 
2014 60 85.67 20.99 214 52 
2015 40 233.43 58.72 584 147 
2016 82 143.84 75.38 360 188 
2017 116 81.97 95.99 205 240 
 
Colorado is only reported from 2002 to 2017 due to a significant lack of transactions 
during 2018 and 2019. The Colorado prices are very close to the Nebraska prices and this was 
expected considering that the market in Colorado has been thinning since the 60’s when Tomek 
first used Chebyshev’s inequality. However, after the market crash Colorado diverges from the 
Nebraska market. 
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 4.13 Rolling Variance  
The last measurement of the variance was calculated using a quarterly rolling variance. 
As mentioned before, the rolling variance allows us to see what is occurring week to week 
instead of just getting one snapshot for the year. All the same accuracy levels were used as in the 
previous variance measurements. Figure 7 shows the actual and needed transactions along with 
the % share of cash negotiations and formula trades. 
Figure 7 
 
The percentages are added to show how changes in the % share of each marketing 
method follow both actual transactions and needed. Figure 8 shows the same as Figure 7 except 
for dressed cattle. The difference between % negotiated transactions and % formula in dressed 
transactions is almost opposite of % shares in live transactions. There are times between 2013 
and 2017 that there are insufficient transactions even at $1.00 level of accuracy however, even 
during this time period there are still week where cash negotiations increase and actual 
transactions exceed needed transactions.  
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Figure 8 
 
Figure 9 combines both live and dressed transactions and it appears that there are 
sufficient transactions is most weeks. Instead of saying there are not enough transactions in all of 
2003, it is clear that this is only isolated to a couple of weeks between December of 2003 and 
January of 2004. The same goes for the market crash; there were several weeks between 2015 
and 2017 that did have sufficient transactions for accurate price discovery, but the large spikes in  
Figure 9 
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the price variance causes the yearly data to assume that the whole year had insufficient 
transactions. This method of measuring the variance is the clearest when there is a lack of price 
discovery. For Nebraska live cattle transactions in Figure 10, it is more clear how this individual 
region looks week to week. The main shocks that have been discussed have been the BSE 
outbreak and the time between 2014 and 2017 however, it is clearer in this figure that these 
where not the only times when there may not have been sufficient transactions, such as 2011.  
The shocks may look more dramatic here but outside of the times of extreme volatility this 
market shows that there is still price discovery occurring.  
Figure 10 
 
In Iowa-Minnesota there seems to be a cyclical pattern to the actual transactions that is 
more consistent than the Nebraska market or the 5-Area market. Although this market is smaller 
compared to the Nebraska, Kansas, or Texas markets, price discovery is increasing which is not 
the case for these other markets. By isolating certain weeks, it is easier to determine when 
insufficient transactions are due to market shocks or if price discovery is simply not happening. 
When looking at the graphs in Figure 15 and Figure 16 in the appendix, it is impossible to 
36 
determine when certain shocks occur during the year or when the market recovers, all that can be 
gleaned is that a shock occurred at some point during that year.  
Figure 11 
 
The rolling variance for boxed beef is very similar to the calculated variance, as seen in 
the other markets between 2014 and 2017 there were times when the market had enough 
transactions. Figure 12 does show how the beef cutout has been losing transactions steadily over 
the past 15 years. Unless there is a significant change in market reporting regulations, it is 
unlikely that any of these markets will increase their cash negotiations.  
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Figure 12 
 
 4.2 Measurement of Accuracy Range  
The second manipulation of Chebyshev’s inequality takes the transactions that have 
occurred in the market and provides a calculated accuracy level instead of an arbitrary number. 
Table 18 includes the average yearly price, the calculated9 c and the prices plus or minus c. For 
the 5-Area live market, the values for c used in the previous section are representative of what 
the calculated values are. As the calculated σ increases the pricing accuracy range increases. It is 
important to note that as accuracy increases the range decreases and as accuracy decreases the 
range increases. As can expected the range widens most between 2014 and 2017 during a time of 
extreme volatility in the market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 All calculations use a 90% probability 
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Table 18 5-Area Live Calculated Pricing Accuracy  
Year Price Calculated c (±) Price c+ Price c- 
2002 67.30 0.24 67.54 67.06 
2003 83.84 0.56 84.40 83.29 
2004 84.37 0.22 84.60 84.15 
2005 87.55 0.26 87.82 87.29 
2006 86.13 0.28 86.41 85.85 
2007 92.62 0.22 92.83 92.40 
2008 92.81 0.32 93.12 92.49 
2009 83.18 0.14 83.32 83.04 
2010 94.92 0.36 95.28 94.57 
2011 114.50 0.47 114.97 114.03 
2012 122.80 0.33 123.13 122.46 
2013 125.92 0.40 126.31 125.52 
2014 154.36 0.91 155.26 153.45 
2015 147.98 1.81 149.80 146.17 
2016 120.92 1.13 122.05 119.78 
2017 121.04 0.77 121.81 120.27 
2018 116.69 0.56 117.25 116.13 
2019 116.79 0.80 117.59 115.99 
 
Figure 13 
 
In Figure 13, the pricing accuracy ranges are barely distinguishable when they are close 
to $0.25 however, in 2015 the range is clearer. In a more efficient market, the error bars would 
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be almost 0. For Nebraska, outside of 2015 and 2016, the pricing range seems to land around 
$0.50, $1.00, and $1.50. These calculations better inform what levels of accuracy are appropriate 
for each market. It has been discussed that some market participants are willing to give up some 
pricing accuracy and these tables show how much market participants could give up, given 
prices and actual transactions. Although these measures provide a range of prices, it is 
understood that there are several prices that will fall above and beneath these levels.  
 
Table 19 Nebraska Live Calculated Pricing Accuracy  
Year Price Calculated c (±) Price c+ Price c- 
2002 67.13 0.62 67.76 66.51 
2003 84.47 1.44 85.91 83.02 
2004 84.45 0.52 84.97 83.92 
2005 87.31 0.68 87.99 86.63 
2006 85.77 0.65 86.42 85.13 
2007 92.17 0.57 92.75 91.60 
2008 92.38 0.83 93.22 91.55 
2009 82.78 0.39 83.17 82.39 
2010 94.71 0.88 95.59 93.83 
2011 115.02 1.09 116.11 113.93 
2012 123.05 0.66 123.71 122.39 
2013 126.25 0.72 126.98 125.53 
2014 154.91 1.39 156.30 153.53 
2015 148.20 3.02 151.22 145.18 
2016 120.91 1.92 122.83 118.99 
2017 121.17 1.29 122.47 119.88 
2018 116.77 0.88 117.66 115.89 
2019 117.10 1.39 118.50 115.71 
 
Due to the smaller number of transactions in the Iowa-Minnesota market, the pricing 
accuracy range increases to compensate. In Figure 14, each error bar is the pricing range at each 
price. An understanding of this calculation could help producers keep better track of how their 
prices compare to the market. 
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Table 20 Iowa-Minnesota Live Calculated Pricing Accuracy  
Year Price Calculated c (±) Price c+ Price c- 
2002 66.97 1.12 68.10 65.85 
2003 83.85 2.58 86.43 81.27 
2004 83.91 0.82 84.74 83.09 
2005 86.80 1.16 87.96 85.65 
2006 85.41 0.96 86.37 84.44 
2007 91.89 0.78 92.67 91.11 
2008 91.46 1.13 92.59 90.33 
2009 82.43 0.56 82.99 81.87 
2010 94.25 1.11 95.36 93.14 
2011 114.93 1.35 116.28 113.58 
2012 122.65 0.76 123.41 121.89 
2013 125.89 0.84 126.73 125.05 
2014 153.83 1.74 155.57 152.09 
2015 147.15 3.50 150.65 143.65 
2016 119.44 3.17 122.61 116.27 
2017 120.66 2.05 122.71 118.60 
2018 116.41 1.30 117.71 115.11 
2019 117.70 1.57 119.26 116.13 
 
Figure 14 
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Table 21 5-Area Dressed Calculated Pricing Accuracy  
Year Price Calculated c (±) Price c+ Price c- 
2002 106.41 0.40 106.82 106.01 
2003 133.95 1.14 135.09 132.81 
2004 133.92 0.41 134.33 133.51 
2005 138.72 0.51 139.23 138.21 
2006 135.86 0.45 136.31 135.41 
2007 146.43 0.41 146.83 146.02 
2008 146.69 0.44 147.13 146.26 
2009 131.79 0.24 132.03 131.56 
2010 151.31 0.58 151.88 150.73 
2011 183.52 0.81 184.33 182.71 
2012 194.77 0.58 195.35 194.19 
2013 200.35 0.54 200.89 199.80 
2014 244.21 1.42 245.63 242.79 
2015 234.16 2.75 236.91 231.41 
2016 190.93 1.98 192.91 188.95 
2017 192.45 1.63 194.09 190.82 
2018 185.09 1.19 186.28 183.90 
2019 187.40 1.46 188.86 185.93 
 
Table 21, shows that the pricing accuracy range increases for the dressed market to roughly 
$0.50, $1.50, and $2.00. For this measurement, prices are left in terms of dressed instead of 
being converted to live prices. The dressed market sustains wider pricing ranges after the market 
shock unlike the live market that returns to a narrower price range. The boxed beef cutout has a 
similar pricing accuracy range to the dressed market. Prices for dressed cattle and the beef cutout 
are much more similar to each other than they are to the live prices due mainly to the fact that 
they are sold at carcass weights10.  
 
 
 
10 Since the cutout value is made up of the primal cuts it is most comparable to carcass weight as whole.  
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Table 22 Boxed Beef Cutout Calculated Pricing Accuracy  
Year Price Calculated c (±) Price c+ Price c- 
2004 136.87 0.64 137.51 136.24 
2005 141.09 0.74 141.83 140.36 
2006 139.86 0.40 140.26 139.46 
2007 145.27 0.66 145.93 144.60 
2008 150.42 0.81 151.23 149.62 
2009 138.64 0.45 139.10 138.19 
2010 154.19 0.90 155.09 153.28 
2011 178.09 0.70 178.79 177.39 
2012 186.35 0.56 186.90 185.79 
2013 191.34 0.67 192.01 190.67 
2014 235.74 1.81 237.55 233.94 
2015 235.01 2.76 237.77 232.26 
2016 203.26 2.31 205.57 200.95 
2017 206.22 2.23 208.44 203.99 
2018 210.32 1.00 211.31 209.32 
2019 209.43 1.90 211.34 207.53 
 
As mentioned before, c is calculated using all 3 measures of the variance. For the 1st 
difference estimation of the variance, prices and transactions remain the same for each regional 
market. The interpretation for c changes with this method and the range is now the difference 
between one market and another. Nebraska estimated has slightly wider pricing ranges between 
2003 and 2008 than the calculated. However, in 2015 the estimated range is about half of what it 
is for the calculated range.  
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Table 23 Nebraska Live 1st Difference Pricing Accuracy  
Year Price Estimated c (±) Price c+ Price c- 
2002 67.13 0.54 67.67 66.60 
2003 84.47 1.59 86.06 82.88 
2004 84.45 1.24 85.69 83.21 
2005 87.31 0.80 88.11 86.50 
2006 85.77 0.89 86.66 84.88 
2007 92.17 0.74 92.92 91.43 
2008 92.38 0.87 93.26 91.51 
2009 82.78 0.66 83.44 82.12 
2010 94.71 0.79 95.50 93.93 
2011 115.02 1.19 116.21 113.84 
2012 123.05 0.74 123.79 122.31 
2013 126.25 0.80 127.05 125.45 
2014 154.91 1.34 156.26 153.57 
2015 148.20 1.48 149.68 146.72 
2016 120.91 1.43 122.34 119.48 
2017 121.17 1.15 122.32 120.03 
2018 116.77 1.07 117.84 115.71 
2019 117.10 1.21 118.32 115.89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 24 Iowa-Minnesota Live 1st Difference Pricing Accuracy  
Year Price Estimated c (±) Price c+ Price c- 
2002 66.97 0.94 67.91 66.04 
2003 83.85 1.42 85.27 82.43 
2004 83.91 1.24 85.16 82.67 
2005 86.80 1.18 87.98 85.63 
2006 85.41 1.30 86.70 84.11 
2007 91.89 1.16 93.05 90.73 
2008 91.46 1.39 92.86 90.07 
2009 82.43 1.23 83.66 81.20 
2010 94.25 0.88 95.13 93.37 
2011 114.93 1.31 116.24 113.62 
2012 122.65 1.36 124.01 121.29 
2013 125.89 1.57 127.46 124.32 
2014 153.83 1.39 155.22 152.44 
2015 147.15 1.37 148.52 145.79 
2016 119.44 2.16 121.60 117.28 
2017 120.66 1.96 122.61 118.70 
2018 116.41 1.55 117.95 114.86 
2019 117.70 1.37 119.07 116.32 
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As in the calculated price range, the estimated range is larger than the other regional 
market due to the number of transactions. Like the comparison between accuracy measures for 
Nebraska, Iowa also sees wider ranges between 2003 and 2008. During the market shock 
however, the estimated and calculated ranges do not deviate from each other as much which is 
consistent with the transaction measures. The rolling variance or in this case standard deviation 
measure for c is shown in Figure 18 in the appendix, these graphs show the accuracy ranges and 
how they move over time. The 5-Area live market only touches the $1.00 level once whereas for 
dressed cattle it crosses the $1.00 level several times. The live Nebraska market crosses the $1.50 
level but follows the 5-Area market very closely. The boxed beef range shows significant 
volatility between 2014 and 2017, this creates a challenge when trying to define an accurate 
price. When comparing the dressed market and the cutout, there are similar spikes however, the 
dressed market does not contract and retract and extremely as the cutout does during this time 
period. Overall, all 3 of these accuracy measures can help inform how market conditions can 
affect pricing accuracy on a yearly and weekly basis.  
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Chapter 5 - Conclusions  
This thesis was written with the goal of shedding light on the current situation of market 
thinness. Several studies have addressed this topic and have offered different models and 
perspective of this issue. Chebyshev’s inequality, though simple in its design and application, 
offers an empirical way to look market thinness. For the live cattle market there are sufficient 
transactions in most weeks (outside of the market crash) at the $0.50 level of accuracy and there 
are more than sufficient transactions at the $1.00 level. Currently Nebraska has the most cattle 
being traded via cash negotiations both in the live and dressed markets. Iowa-Minnesota though 
a smaller market, has increased their negotiated transactions rather than decreasing. Kansas still 
has some price discovery occurring however, they are trending down looking forward. Texas-
Oklahoma-New Mexico and Colorado continue to have insufficient transactions and price 
discovery in these regions is questionable. 
The three measurements of the variance add to previous literature in their comparison and 
the ability to isolate the weeks where there are not enough transactions for accurate price 
discovery. The first measurement highlights shocks to the market that cause disruptions in price 
discovery. The use of the 1st differences estimation allows us to see how the regional markets 
interact with each other and when prices in the individual markets converge or diverge from each 
other. The third measurement uses a rolling variance to track changes in the market on a weekly 
basis. This third measure is the most important addition to the literature since it shows clearly 
which time periods actual transactions are equal to or greater than transactions needed at a given 
probability and accuracy level.  
For the accuracy measurements, the same methods used to calculate the variance were 
applied to the SD. During “normal” market conditions, it seems that $0.50, $1.00, and $1.50 are 
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the ranges that fit all markets evaluated best. With this knowledge it helps confirm the accuracy 
levels chosen for the transaction measurements. In a market with perfect price transmission 
pricing accuracy would not be as big of an issue but that is not the case so having an accurate 
gauge of how far prices can deviate from the true price can help producers and packers alike 
know where they stand as they look to market their cattle.  
There are a couple of limitations to this study with the method and the data. In 
Chebyshev’s inequality the equations can be manipulated in such a way that depending on the 
transaction size, probability, or accuracy level used, one could either say that there are not 
enough transactions occurring in the market or that there are plenty. It is important to take these 
measurements than with a grain of salt and only use them as an estimation and not as a definitive 
answer to the market thinness question. Since the USDA can only report head of cattle and not 
individual market transactions it is hard to say whether these measures are actually consistent 
with what is occurring in the market. The reports themselves are weighted averages of the prices, 
weights, and head of cattle so as the data is evaluated further, true market volatility and the true 
variance in prices are not accounted for. In Ajewole et al., 2016, they propose the use of median 
absolute deviation instead of a weighted average for the USDA report in order to better represent 
the information in these reports. Further work on this topic could include how the futures market 
interacts with the live, dressed, and boxed beef markets within the methods used. It would also 
be interesting to see how market thinness effect the feeder cattle market and where price 
discovery occurs. Bessler & Davis, 2004 and Stockton et al., 2010 determine which weight group 
and sex contributes most to price discovery in Texas and Nebraska respectively using similar 
methods. Another limitation of this research is that it assumes that all the cattle are homogeneous 
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and do not deviate in quality. If one were able to account for quality differences within this 
study, it could be more accurate in simulating actual market conditions. 
This study is meant to be an objective measure of market thinness. There are many 
reasons why market participants have deviated from using the cash market. The efficiency of 
formula trading and other marketing arrangements often outweigh the benefits of having more 
trade in the cash markets. Regardless of the benefits of having a thicker cash market, the cost to 
producers and packers could be detrimental to the market as a whole. Some market participants 
and policy makers are concerned however, that the cash market is as a point that the benefits of 
alternative market arrangements could be outweighed by the cost of a thin cash market. 
Regardless of which side you stand on, markets will adjust and change either through the 
initiative of the participants or by necessity. It is in the interest of both market participants and 
policy makers to be actively pursuing a solution together rather than waiting until change 
inevitable comes.  
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